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3In the public discussions of the last few years,
comments on various aspects of the political
culture of Hungary – including the public
sphere, the status of citizenship, the state and
achievements of the media – were often
organised around a few commonly accepted
assumptions. This essay examines these
assessments in a novel and unified conceptual
framework. Apart from analysing the
phenomena which give us cause to hope as 
well as – or to an even greater extent – to worry, 
we shall suggest that one of the so-called
‘diseases’ of Hungarian public life is the very
method which is occasionally used to evaluate
its features and its development. For Hungary,
joining the European Union meant crossing 
an historical boundary, with the result that now 
we can call our home simply ‘Europe’, without
any qualifications. The fundamental idea behind
this essay is that this shift of epochs requires
a new set of assumptions in investigating the
state of the republic as a symbolic community.
The conceptual starting point of this research is
the experience of everyday life, and the view
which considers the public sphere and public
affairs as a network formed by public sub-spheres,
and of more or less stable temporary publicities.
We are convinced that the ‘social entrapments’,
the hysterics, the self-fulfilling catastrophic
predictions of public life are largely caused by
blame-shifting and the evading of responsibilities.
People blame politics for their difficulties,
the participants of political life keep pointing
their fingers to each other, and if there is no-one
else left, one can always say its all the media’s
fault. What we propose – on the basis of  a novel
interpretation of the situation – is the possibility
of a new distribution of responsibilities.
According to this proposal, the vicious circles
formed by the relationships among citizens,
politics and media – resulting from incapacity,
cynicism, lack of trust, and indifference – can 
be transformed into virtuous circles, where
– serious norms of public life are formulated 
– the public and citizens are regarded as 
grown-ups
– instead of the contrast between blind faith 
and paranoia, we have the various registers of
trust and competition based on the respect 
of others
– when someone says ‘I don’t care’ this means 
‘I care about something else’
– political participation means more than
collecting  membership cards; it means that
people are capable of connecting their interests
and motivations to the actions of public life
and public policies
– politics aims to interfere with affairs and not
with minds
– the media is not only formally independent,
but it is also an area of professional autonomy
– the neurotic rituals of public life are replaced
by the entertaining or captivating new culture
of the republic
– people relate to the uncertainties, ambiguities
and doubts of everyday life in the 21st century
in a different way: they experience it not as a
negative phenomenon, but as a possibility or
an inspiration for creativity
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5The situation viewed from 
a distance
If we wanted to describe the present state of
Hungarian public life or politics to someone who
is entirely new to the situation, the resulting
picture would probably be confusing and include
somewhat contradictory elements. On the one
hand, since 1990, there has been no need to
bring forward election dates, which means that
each winning coalition has served the full four
years for which it was elected. Another indication
of the stability of the political and social system
is the fact that Hungary didn’t make the cover
pages of the international press in the last fifteen
years in connection with armed conflicts, terrorist
attacks or an incipient civil war – while 
the same is not true of a number of countries in
Europe. The annual country rating of the
Freedom House (2004) has awarded Hungary
the status of ‘free’ for a number of years, which
means that political and civil rights are 
not under threat, and the institutions of the 
constitutional state are firmly grounded.  
Assessed by the usual criteria for the freedom of
the media, Hungary’s achievement is satisfactory.
The majority of the harmonisation of media 
regulations required by the EU was in place
well before Hungary’s accession. The media has
undergone a technical-technological moderni-
sation after the transition, the tangible evidence
indicates a colourful media culture. The selection
offered by newsstands should not embarrass
even a country of a greater size. The number of
students applying for media studies departments
has been steadily growing. According to a
research conducted by the World Internet
Project, Hungarians are enthusiastic buyers of
info-communicational products, the data of
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consumers of news, and on occasions when 
citizens feel the stakes are serious, they turn up
at the ballot boxes in relatively large numbers. 
The situation in close-up
At the same time, many complaints are voiced
about the state of public life. A dream inconceivable
for many years, free elections, mobilised only
two thirds of the citizens eligible for voting. In
the last fifteen years, each local parliamentary
by-election had less than half of the constituents
showing up. A cynical observer may draw the
conclusion from this that valid elections are 
possible in Hungary only when the (otherwise 
passionately disliked) election TV programs succeed
in whipping the populations into a frenzy. The
referendum about one of the most important – 
if not the most important – events of recent
Hungarian history, the accession to the EU,
sank into a surprising lack of interest. True, the
2002 parliamentary elections mobilised a large
percentage of the population, but many thought
this was a mixed blessing; the political rivalry
between the left and the right created tensions
and strong feelings on the street, at the 
workplace, and in families, in dimensions and
depth which had been unknown hitherto. 
Focusing on the younger generations, certain
aspects of public life seem to be in a particularly
worrying state. According to a survey conducted
in 2004, political activity, interest in politics,
and willingness to vote is lower among the 18–29
year olds than in 2000, and lower than in the
entire population. In every hundred young people,
only one is member of a political organisation.1
And there is more here than mere indifference:
the younger generations do not have faith in
public institutions. According to the survey ‘Youth
2004’, the only institutions which enjoy a status
of being relatively trusted are the courts, the
military and the police (Bauer & Szabó 2005).
Among the most visible representatives
of public institutions – including the media, the
church or the political parties involved in 
legislation – no-one is really trusted by the younger
generations.
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S O U R C E : Bauer & Szabó, (2005) Ifjúság 2004 Gyorsjelentés (2004 Youth Report)
7When compared to the citizens of other former
communist countries, Hungarians are the most
pessimistic about their prospects in the future
(Róbert 2005). Hungarians, together with
the Czechs, have the smallest trust in political
institutions and the media (CEORG 2004).
According to the data of the comparative
international ‘World Values Survey’, people’s sub
jective feeling of satisfaction usually correlates
with the economic development of their country
(Inglehart 2000). The only countries where this
correlation visibly fails to hold are the former
communist countries, whose citizens usually 
profess themselves unhappier than those of 
significantly poorer countries like Nigeria or India.
The survey thus shows that apart from economic
development, people’s feeling of satisfaction
depends on whether they have lived under 
communism or not. Another correlation pointed out
by observers holds between a society’s subjective
feeling of satisfaction, and the state of the 
democratic institutions. Dissatisfaction destabilises
the political and social institutions, whereas
contentment has a beneficial effect on the 
functioning of the institutions of democracy
(Inglehart and Klingemann, 2000). 
Everyday experience is full of instances where
we feel let down; the bus door closes just 
before one can get on, there is corruption in the
bureaucracy of everyday affairs, one witnesses
others cynically abusing legislative loopholes.
The mistrust emerging in the wake of these
phenomena weaves through the whole of public
life, and damages our common national assets.
S O U R C E : World Values Survey
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8Citizens do not trust the services provided by
the state, and try to find individualised solutions
for themselves. Tax paying moral is appalling, 
but the state lays its severity on those who cannot
hide their resources: employers, employees and
consumers. All this give cause for great concern,
since many researchers have concluded that 
people’s trust in each other and in institutions,
reinforced by shared norms, is the safest 
investment for a society (Putnam 1993). When
trust is lacking, corruption will bloom, business
transactions become more expensive and hence 
less economic, and state services turn out to 
be wasteful and therefore usually more unjust.
We saw that people don’t trust politics, but 
politics does not seem to have a high opinion of 
people either. Members of parliament sometimes
expect society to offer them feudalistic privileges:
for example exemption from parking restrictions,
or from the ban on drink driving. A memorable
leak revealed a leading political figure declaring
the membership of his own party to be ‘terrible’.
At a high-stake secret ballot in the parliament,
one of the parties showed its mistrust in its own
representatives by requiring them to show their
voting slip to a ‘supervisor’.
Economic Nobel prize winner Amartya Sen
pointed out that – contrary perhaps to the usually
held opinion – a colourful public life or freedom
of the press is not a privilege of the richer 
countries. Identifying social problems and
responsibilities, discussing norms of justice,
achieving transparency in public affairs – how
effectively these activities are conducted in 
the public sphere contributes significantly to the
welfare of a country. Observations about the
media in Hungary pointed out a number of 
troubling phenomena. The hierarchy of prestige 
in the media is changing, pushing up more and
more the entertainment sector, while the rest
looks on with despair or with cynicism. Some of
the most widely circulated dailies occasionally
fail to separate information and opinion; local media
is often overtaken by dilettantes; investigative
journalism extends as far as the love life 
of pop stars, or simply the publications
of documents obtained from the political black
market. The prestige of the media is low in the
eyes of the public, the politicians and the 
profession alike. Professional solidarity is a 
virtually unknown notion among media 
workers, and while this may favour some in the
short term, it results in the increasing vulnerability
of the profession to both political and economic
powers. In the last few years, the share of the
tabloid press has dramatically increased at the
expense of the ‘serious’ segment of the press. 
This phenomenon is probably not unrelated to the
fact that the ‘serious’ press seems to consider
more important to write according to the taste of
their readers, than to take indeed seriously the
task of objective reporting.   
Which radio or TV channel one considers as
‘trustworthy’ is by now strictly determined by
ideological preferences; and many seem to think
that unbiased and reliable information is 
‘just one opinion among the others’. The public TV
channel is a marginal affair with a one-digit
viewing percentage. This phenomenon is perhaps
not independent of the fact that the left and the
right seem to agree at least on one question:
that whoever is on government, a high-quality,
popular, professionally and financially independent
public TV can only harm political interests.
There is no hope for a remedy for the constant
9organisational and financial crisis of the public
media, because the chance for the acceptance 
of a new media law is minimal. (Bajomi & Sükösd,
2003). Other worrying phenomena concern 
the connections among the agendas of the media,
the public opinion and politics. Even though 
one of the most important functions of the media
is supposed to be keeping an eye on politicians,
the occasional expositions are hardly more than
empty words, if the exposed politicians almost
always remain in their posts. The political 
vendettas formerly characterising the more bitter
end of election campaigns have become everyday
occurrences even between the elections.
Sometimes one hears that the press would like a
final and definitive ethical code, following the
example of the BBC Producers’ Guidelines. The
ultimate authorities for intellectuals with an
interest in the media are George Gerbner and
Marshall MacLuhan (whose works by now belong
more to intellectual history.) Public thinking
about the role of media in our everyday life is
dominated by antagonistic notions like ‘media
manipulations’, ‘subliminal influence’, or the victim-
consumer ‘helplessly exposed’ to the influence 
of advertisements. When the question of 
professional norms is raised, the press points at
the almighty audience; at the same time public
discussions about the shortcomings of the media
blame everything on the commercial TV companies.
How bad is it in fact?
The reader has perhaps started to feel slightly
dizzy when presented with such an array of 
difficulties and failures. One might be tempted
to draw the conclusion that public life in
Hungary is beyond redemption. However, some
of these worrying phenomena deserve a second,
closer look. The proper assessment of the negative
and positive experiences listed in the previous
two sections presents a serious theoretical challenge.
Let us start with the end of the list. When 
considering issues about the media, first we have
to separate the problems specific to the Hungarian
situation, from those which emerge in most 
democratic systems. For example, if we want to
form a realistic picture of the state of public
media, we have to remind ourselves that the 
idealised norm of the public TV with the BBC 
as its model, is about as exceptional in the world’s
media culture, as a classic English lawn is in
horticulture. There is no similar public TV in the
US, and there is no public media to the East of
the Elba with an achievement comparable to
that of the BBC. A first-rate public media  with
high viewing rates seems obtainable in countries
where self-control displayed by political forces 
is part of a long political tradition – self-control,
that is, concerning administrative-financial
interference with the activities of the media.
And traditions take time to develop. The rule of
law requires a fine balance of powers and self-
controlling mechanisms, embodied in traditional
norms and conventions of behaviour – and these
cannot be introduced in one day by simply passing
a bill, just as Hungarian cannot be learnt in 
one week by buying a phrase-book. This does not
mean that only time will bring a solution to 
our problems, and until the tradition is cemented,
there is nothing anyone can do to improve the
situation. It is quite clear, however, that without
a pronounced political will of the society, the
political elite will be slow in finding solutions;
and consequently, society itself will have to fight
for a public media with a higher quality. The way
to achieve this is through political and professional
lobbying for forming social policies concerning
the regulation of the media. A further point is
that due to the changes in info-communication
technologies, even the BBC finds itself 
in circumstances very different from those of the
10
era of a few terrestrial channels. The task 
therefore is not to pine after the BBC, but to figure
out which type of digital communication medium
should fulfil the role traditionally associated
with the public media. 
Somewhat similar observations can be made about
the lack of trust permeating the various aspects
of private life-worlds and the public life. Respect
for the dignity of the free individual and a 
system of norms and relations of trust weaving
through civil society are part of the tradition 
of Western societies. The tradition of our society
is different. For many decades, one of the 
most important public norm of behaviour has been
the denial of personal preferences (Kuran 1995).
An important source of revenue  has been the
‘privatisation’ of some structural social problem
– for example exploiting the possibilities provided
by an economy of shortage. Furthermore, our
society has not gone through a common cathartic
experience , which would have provided 
opportunity for openly discussing the events of the
past, when the Hungarian state systematically
killed or terrorised some of its own citizens. To
expect this society to adopt, from one day to
another, the norms of responsible citizenship and
caring for the abstract notion of the public good
– this may sound about as arrogant as the
advice of Marie Antoinette to her subjects, to eat
cake if they don’t have bread. Sometimes 
assessments about the state of public life and
the ensuing directions for improvement seem to
suggest that at the moment, Hungarian society,
lead by some ‘hysterical’ or ‘self-destroying’
pathology, is incapable of following common
sense and is therefore incapable of adopting the
culture of the rule of law. Our proposal is 
that instead of declaring social problems to be
pathologies, and instead of hand-wringing 
over the ‘illness’ of society, we should focus on
the motivations, actions, values and convictions
which together form what we know today as
public life in Hungary.
In a similar vein, we also suggest that the negative
or detached attitudes towards politics – discussed
above in section 2.2. – should be viewed in a
more differentiated manner, one which does not
demonise or declares pathological the bearers 
of these attitudes. First, a remark about the
participation at elections – which is perhaps the
most prominent embodiment of the citizens’
responsible behaviour towards their country. In
fact, the percentages of participation in Hungary
are not especially low compared to other 
countries. 3 In any case, it is rather questionable
whether the ideal politically conscious citizen,
who wakes up with the political news, goes to
public inquiries or political debating societies
after work4, and never forms an opinion without
weighing the views of all interested parties,
exists anywhere outside the pages of democracy
textbooks.
Critics of the politics of mass democracies 
sometimes make the mistake of mechanically 
summing the worrying attitudes displayed by
citizens, and believe that this results in a valid
diagnosis of the pathologies of public life. What
does it mean exactly to say that people are 
ignorant about, or not interested in, public affairs?
Let us consider an analogy: if someone made 
a survey in a car factory about the information
the workers have about each of the different
phases of the production, or about each of the
hundred different parts of a car, then wouldn’t
it be surprising – in light of the presumably
very low average level of information –, that the
factory ever produced a functioning vehicle?
Politics, just like every complex activity requiring
cooperation, is subject to a social division of
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labour. Apart from being useful, this is also fair,
since it makes possible that those who pay 
more attention to, and invest more energy into 
public affairs, receive a larger share in the
process of decision making. Furthermore, it is a
commonplace in political science that collective
wisdom emerges from the individual ignorance
or incoherence of citizens (Page & Shapiro 1992). 
The interpretation of the phenomena of public
life is of course a challenging and complex task.
Theoretical studies in political science as well 
as empirical research have been trying to find an
explanation for the following peculiar combination
of phenomena. According to surveys conducted
in the nineties, Hungarians are the most 
dissatisfied with the results of the transition from
communism compared to other former communist
countries, and yet Hungarians are also the 
most patient, in terms of the number of political
demonstrations (Greskovits 1998). Should we
simply conclude that we are a pathetic lot–
though we complain all the time, we let anyone
to do anything to us. If one wants to step beyond
these kind of commonplaces – as the creators 
of social policies or election campaigns certainly
would –, one has to take a closer look at what
these results might mean. (In any case, since
none of the prime ministers of the Hungarian
democracy has been so far given a chance to
serve more than four years, they would probably
have a different view of the infinite forbearance 
of Hungarians.) Our suggestion for the explanation
of the dissatisfaction is that the Hungarian 
middle classes invested a great effort into surviving
the gradually escalating economic crisis 
of the eighties, the recession of the early nineties,
and the difficult period afterwards. At the same
time, the source of patience was the fact that
these people still had a lot to lose even in these
hard times. They simply had to compare the 
situation of the seriously disadvantaged segment
constituting about one seventh of the population,
with their own material and symbolic assets
which they managed to save from the Kádár-
regime. Besides, the wariness about demonstrations
might have a source in the fact that in the 
modern history of Hungary, civil disobedience
never  lead to stable result.
In order to understand the peculiar paradox 
of dissatisfaction and patience, we could use the
metaphor of queuing. The transition from 
communism could not do away with the old
instinct, acquired back in the communist times, 
that bettering oneself is simply a matter of 
time, patience and stamina; and that is why people
are patient. At the same time, the queues leading
to betterment (decent living conditions, a new
car, professional promotion) started to display
increasingly stranger dynamics after the transition.
For example, it could turn out that even though
someone is uncomplainingly standing in a queue,
more and more people turn up in front of them.
Others may have found that the desired goods
are sold at the beginning of a queue that they don’t
even have the chance to join. And the dissolution
of the prematurely born socialist welfare state
occasionally resulted in some queue-ers suddenly
finding themselves face to face with a sign saying
‘service is temporarily out of order’. In Saigon, 
the restaurant-owners fleeing before the
Vietkong takeover of the city, took not their TV
sets or other valuables with themselves, but
their old, worn, cracked and smoky pots, which
preserved the flavours of decades of cooking. In a
12
similar way, when entering the new era after
the transition, many Hungarians took their 
low-budget, simple and durable life-plans which
helped them to survive the previous epoch with
more or less success. Hungarians are dissatisfied
because they have something to lose, and patient
because they have something to lose.
So why do Hungarians really 
dislike politics?
Understanding the forces behind the bitterness
felt by many after the transition from communism,
and the forces behind the attempts to do 
something about this, poses a serious challenge.
According to Péter Róbert (2000), the interaction
among the various economic, political, cultural
and psychological factors is so complicated that
the question in the title of this section cannot 
be answered directly. One probably doesn’t have
to be a political scientist to see why, at the
beginning of the nineties, people turned away
from politics, when the most manifest effect 
of the activities of this politics was that most of
them lost about one quarter of the value of their
income. International comparative surveys 
have shown that another factor contributing to the
negative attitude towards democracy in Hungary
was the tough or occasionally aggressive tone 
in the public sphere, and the egoism and
unscrupulousness experienced in everyday life.
Negative attitudes towards the political elite
were shown to have resulted from the lack of
democratic traditions, the inexperience of politicians,
and the suboptimal achievement of institutions.
S O U R C E : TÁRKI (2005) A lakosság véleménye a demokrácia mûködésérôl 
(Popular Opinions of the Functioning of Democracy)
30,0
20,0
10,0
0,0
-10,0
-20,0
-30,0
-40,0
1
9
9
9
–
0
3
 
1
9
9
9
–
0
5
1
9
9
9
–
0
7
1
9
9
9
–
1
0
2
0
0
0
–
0
1
2
0
0
0
–
0
3
2
0
0
0
–
0
5
2
0
0
0
–
0
7
2
0
0
0
–
0
9
2
0
0
0
–
1
1
2
0
0
1
–
0
1
2
0
0
1
–
0
3
2
0
0
1
–
0
5
2
0
0
1
–
0
7
2
0
0
1
–
0
9
2
0
0
1
–
1
1
2
0
0
2
–
0
1
2
0
0
2
–
0
3
2
0
0
2
–
0
5
2
0
0
2
–
0
7
2
0
0
2
–
0
9
2
0
0
2
–
1
1
2
0
0
3
–
0
1
2
0
0
3
–
0
3
2
0
0
3
–
0
5
2
0
0
3
–
0
7
2
0
0
3
–
0
9
2
0
0
3
–
1
1
2
0
0
4
–
0
1
2
0
0
4
–
0
3
2
0
0
4
–
0
5
2
0
0
4
–
0
7
2
0
0
4
–
0
9
2
0
0
4
–
1
1
2
0
0
5
–
0
1
2
0
0
5
–
0
3
2
0
0
5
–
0
5
2
0
0
5
–
0
7
G O V E R N M E N T O P P O S I T I O N  
POPULAR EVALUATION OF DEMOCRACY AND THE GOVERNMENT'S
AND OPPOSITION'S WORK
D E M O C R A C Y  
When we try to answer the question of why 
people have grown suspicious of politics, we have
also have to take into account the fact that they
‘dislike politics’ not to the same extent, not 
in the same way, and not for the same reason. 
A survey by TÁRKI (2005) shows first of all that
the extent of satisfaction with democracy almost
always correlates with the popularity of the
actually serving government. This suggest the
somewhat troubling conclusion that what people
consider as the essence of democracy is not so
much political competition, but rather the rule of
the political forces they prefer. At the same time,
the survey helps to dispel a common misconception.
Looking at the changes in the popularity of the
Orbán and Medgyessy governments,  it turns out
that state distribution of goods is not really a
stable factor in the rising of the government’s
popularity.
Several surveys have pointed out another important
factor in the dislike of politics: this is due to 
a sort of double lens through which people view
the present and the pre-transition period.
Compared to people in other former communist
countries, Hungarians are least critical about
the past regime. They weigh the achievements of
democracy against those of the past regime,
while in their memories the past somehow started
to look better than it actually was; and this
process contributed to the formation of negative
attitudes about the workings of democracy
(Simon 2001). Furthermore, they compared their
present situation with their conception of the
West formed in the eighties, and this comparison
also played part in their disappointment
(Csizmadia 2001).
Some additional factors which contributed to 
the rejection of politics were the following. For the
majority of people, it took some time to get used
to certain features of the workings of politics –
that is, if they got used to them at all. For example,
they didn’t realize right away that participants
in the political competition do not really aim 
at understanding and solving the problems of
individuals, but rather try to sell bigger packages
combining ideological, cultural and professional
elements. Perhaps this misunderstanding causes
the incomprehension shown by many of the 
mere idea of political conflicts: the feeling that
can be expressed by saying that ‘these guys are
just fighting each other, instead of caring about
the affairs of the country’. The conception 
of politics favoured by the political elite and 
the institutions differed from that of the rest of
the society for example with respect to certain
norms of democracy and constitution (say on the
question of replacing ID-cards for reasons having
to do with data-protection, or on the apparently
negative effects of freedom of press and freedom
of speech.) Careful deliberations about the political
possibilities were missing; and hence members
of the society could hardly be expected to join a
segment of the political spectrum according to  
a political worldview formed in the usual way of
political socialization (Fricz, 2001). Instead, 
the largely arbitrarily formed political preferences
were solidified by ritualised political conflicts,
and the resulting inflexible fronts reproduced
the same rituals of conflict and resentment. In the
course of happier versions of political socialization,
the ideologies and worldviews embedded in 
values produce political emotions; in Hungary, 
it happened the other way around (Marián &
Szabó, 1996).
* * *
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So it seems that we have a distressingly large
array of factors to take into account in deciding
what is exactly wrong with the achievements 
of the Hungarian democracy. The remarkable
results of a variety of research conducted in
political science in the nineties reveal a rather
peculiar situation. With enormous efforts, the
bulk of Hungarian society have made it through
the hardest years; yet most people did not 
experience the transformation of the economic
system as a financial or cultural improvement.
Hungary is a stable constitutional democracy,
but the public perception of politics often registers
a failure, due to the conflicts among parties 
and other interest groups. In international 
comparison, Hungary has a high number of social
organisations; yet the citizens’ interest in the
affairs of the community is shown to be minimal
by various surveys. The conclusion starting to
emerge from all this is that the concerns about
the state of the public life, the political scene
and the democracy in general, are nothing but a
vague matter of belief, supported by a handful 
of phenomena selectively picked for this purpose.
Dissolving these tensions may be achieved by 
an apparently simple method: we should take into
account not only what people tell pollsters about
their interest in politics, but also their participation
in affairs which keep them occupied in their
everyday lives quite apart from the business
conducted by opinion polls.
15
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Was it a coincidence that state socialism col-
lapsed in East-Europe just about the time when
the West also witnessed a social transformation
of an historical dimension? We do not know yet.
In any case, the process called ‘late capitalism’
or ‘second modernity’ or ‘neo-liberal system
change’ has brought a change which effected the
entire structure of society. Let us just highlight
a few crucial elements. Today’s employees do not
have a lifelong ‘direct ticket’ for their journey 
on the labour-market; instead, they have to secure
their positions with various ‘transfers’. They
have to learn languages when they are grown
up, they continuously have to update their
knowledge of new technologies and regulations.
‘Work’ as traditionally conceived has also
changed a lot; the typical working environment
of informational society is not the shop-floor 
in the factory, but the workshop or office offering
services. The social and cultural changes made
many ‘pre-societal’ family relations the subject of
choice and calculation. For example, these days
the issue of having children is influenced by 
people’s carrier possibilities, or simply by their
choice of a certain form of life (Beck, Bonss 
& Lau, 2003). The formerly clear distinctions
between work, leisure and entertainment are
hopelessly blurred. In late capitalism, work is
supposed to be a passion or a form of life. If people
used to relax with a friendly game of soccer 
with the loser paying the beers afterwards, today’s
‘working out’ in the gym seems to be considered
more like a duty. Television used to offer news
and entertainment; now the main attraction is
prime-time infotainment. ‘Escape from the
everyday world’ is provided not by sentimental
operettas or the adventures of Zorro, but by 
programs where decidedly everyday people reveal
their decidedly everyday problems. One important
factor in the political competition brought to 
us by the media is how photogenic a certain
politician is, and the winner of a parliamentary
debate is usually the person whose amusing
rejoinder or catchy turn of phrase is broadcasted
in the evening news panel. Political campaigns
are based on the everyday cultural or lifestyle
aspirations of people, and at the same time election
campaigns extend to the entire length of a 
parliamentary cycle.
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The competition in national politics is conducted
on a different battlefield. The ranks of traditional
players of shaping politics – that is, political 
parties, trade unions, and the relatively small
number of media channels devoted to political
affairs – are joined by new players: societal
organisations, single-issue movements, economic
lobbies, professional-scientific-intellectual networks,
popular entertainment business and various
commercial media channels (Blumler & Kavanagh
1999). Politics is formed not by the cooperation
and rivalry of a handful of easily identifiable
goals; today’s making of politics is a much more
inscrutable, contingent and complex process. 
In the new political space, the content of political
messages matters less than the rules of the
game and the trustworthiness of the participants
(see Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003:9). The work of 
the government in late capitalism consists not so
much in the production of decrees, but rather 
in cooperation, sharing of responsibilities, and the
management of trust. In the politics of late 
capitalism, the question is not only what the 
government does, and to what extent they win the 
support of citizens’ to back their actions, but 
also whether the public policies managed by the 
government succeed in actively involving 
the citizens and other social organisations.
This way of governing is naturally less formalised,
less ‘carved in stone’ than the traditional 
institutional-administrative way of governing. It is
not the case that in late capitalism, the state acts 
in an ad hoc manner; but since its goal is to provide
opportunities for citizens (and not merely to 
satisfy their needs), the solutions are occasionally
temporary, spontaneous and experimental. 
In the activities of the service state aiming to
conform to a diverse range of sub-politics, the
contingencies and ambiguities of neo-liberal society
do not appear as problems, but as the natural
context for performing the tasks at hand (Stone
1998/2002). Accordingly, the activity of the 
government offers self-evident solutions to some
people, while others will see the same activities 
as unpredictable, chaotic, and, at the end, arbitrary.
One of the important aspects of late modern
society and politics is that the disappearance of
a universal social policy covering the affairs 
of the ‘big society’ results in the disintegration
of the public sphere. People find the events and
messages relevant for them in parallel public 
sub- spheres, which have their own values, and 
occasionally their own characteristic forms of media
(Gitlin 1998). The public sphere of the former
‘big society’ had a ‘finished’, and relatively simple
structure. The pluralisation of this sphere means
that those who prefer unambiguous, authoritative
and comprehensible tones will still find political
and cultural messages according to their taste;
just like say the protectors of the Hun tradition
descending from Attila the Hun, who can benefit
from downloading the ‘Hun alphabet’ from 
various internet sites. The parallel lives of the
traditional and the late modern politics can 
be found in virtually every segment of the society.
Consider for example the issue of media 
regulations: here, the latest European norms 
of communication regulations face the opinion of
those who think that media regulation should
involve a strict regulation of tastes.
Hungary was not entirely unprepared for 
the changes brought by these developments. The
important influences in the Hungary of the
eighties included the cultural and consumerist
aspects of globalisation, the environmental 
disaster of Chernobyl, certain signs of crisis in
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the socialist economy, the change in the structure
of families, or a noticeable individualisation 
of life-styles. Almost everyone blamed state
socialism for the troubling aspects of this 
slow transformation, whereas the more encouraging
phenomena carried the promise of a more
autonomous society. It came as a shock that 
the birth of democracy brought an economic crisis
that had not been seen for generations. What
happened was similar to a type of recurring
phenomenon in the history of East-European
countries: the economic underdevelopment
required a radical development program in the
new democracies, for example in transforming
the economics, or in cutting back social benefits,
and all this caused a kind of trauma that the –
in any case better situated – Western societies
hardly ever had to suffer. No wonder that an
economic crisis comparable to the Great Depression
necessarily brought with it the scepticism, 
rejection and faithlessness about politics.  
At the same time, we will venture to say that
the political elite in charge of the transition from
communism, and especially the first freely elected
government, was blameable for not making it
clear for the rest of the society how catastrophic
the state of the economy was. The catharsis 
provided by the transition gave a chance to the
political elite to tell people straight about 
the depth of the crisis, and about the difficulties
to be expected. It is a commonplace in sociology
and political science that in the time of crisis,
honesty about the situation increases people’s
willingness to accept the burden they have to
bear in order to overcome the crisis. The same
political elite is justly praised for their self-control
and for the compromises they made in the interest
of a functioning governance. They would have
also needed courage and openness towards the
society, but here they failed to do the right thing.
The system of political sub-spheres in late 
modernity, despite some deceptively similar 
features, is fundamentally different from the 
individualistic, atomistic citizenship of the state
socialist era, when security seemed to lie in 
isolation. Perhaps it is true that the citizens of
the democracy do not care more about the 
political events broadcasted in the news panel
than the previous generation did during state
socialism. However, the attitude of ‘non-politics’
is replaced by a passionate interest in a few 
specific public affairs, which vary from person to
person, from group to group.
The citizen who does not pay too much attention
to politics is still a subject of public policies, an
agent who recognises and tries to handle the
new risks of the transforming world – and hence
cannot be regarded as an isolated, passive victim
in the traditional sense. The vision of an idealised
public life or public participation, one that 
figures in the methodology of research on political
action, hides the multiplicity of the occasionally
temporary, occasionally marginal and certainly
contingent public sub-spheres populated by 
people’s everyday concerns. We have already
referred to the indifference and distrust the
younger generations seem to show towards politics.
This phenomenon will be seen in a new light
once we take into account the changes which
young people realise through the choices of their
forms of life. When they are contemplating 
their career choices, given the possibilities to
start a family, or to receive state funding to buy
their first home; when they worry about the
quality of foodstuff, or about the increasing use
of drugs; that is, when they test new norms and
values in their own lives – this is when they
bring decisions as the subjects and actors of the
politics of everyday life. Consider another example.
In Hungary, it is a widespread custom – for
those who can afford it – to give a considerable
sum of money to the doctor who helps a mother
through childbirth, even if the doctor and 
the medical services are paid by social security.
Recently, someone set up an internet site, where
potential and practising mothers shared their
experiences about where, and who, and how much
– and about hospitals, nurses, doctors and so 
on. If a political scientist had asked them whether
they were interested in politics, the answers
would probably have shown nothing above the
average. These young women, however, participated
enthusiastically in a dialogue which had 
serious implications to public policies, since they
felt it had something to do with their own life. 
It is not possible these days to enlist the whole
society in support of ambitious and shared political
goals; one reason for this is that the rival 
political parties of late modernity do not leave a 
single segment of the public life uncovered by
their ideological or evaluative labels. At the
same time, the members of society purposefully
express their opinion and bring their decisions
about many smaller political issues which affect
their lives more closely (Hauser 1999). Some
people are seriously concerned about the fate of
poppy-seed cakes in the EU-member Hungary –
since one of the curiously popular urban myths
before the country’s accession was that poppy-seed
would be banned in the European Union. Others
worry about the E-components in food, yet 
others see globalisation as an immediate threat,
and some consider national identity or the future
of the language as the most pressing issue 
in contemporary life. Those who would like to 
protect children from the effects of violence 
on TV, or those who are committed to the use of
bicycles in the cities, would probably fail to 
find many points of shared interest with the
patrons of Hungarian dog breeds, or the followers
of pedagogical reforms. One thing, however, is
true of all these people. None of them matches
the fictional character of  ‘citizen’ inherited from
traditional politics, and therefore they will all
appear as indifferent about politics in the surveys
about political culture.
The occasionally chaotic system of political 
sub-spheres interwoven with the issues of everyday
life is possibly less grand and less ‘finished’ than
the vision of idealised democratic participation –
though perhaps the latter has never actually
existed. But since these political sub-spheres are
rooted in the experiences of everyday life, this
sort of politics, and not apolitical isolation, is the
essence of democracy in late modernity.
The vicious circle
Most of the problems with contemporary democracy
result from the interaction of certain smaller
problems and their self-generating reproduction.
Some of these smaller problems are outcomes 
of inevitable necessities; others are consequences
of bad decisions. To put it briefly, the competition
of post-modern politics, the ‘wall-to-wall’ total
contest, which activates the codes of everyday life,
and employs the recent media techniques, gains
people’s trust less and less (Chaney, 2001). This
fact induces political communication to invest
even more creativity into the mobilisation of 
people’s everyday likings and dislikings. In this
way, however, the abstract allegiance to the
republic is becoming  more and more meaningless.
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The problems of politics
One of the main issues concerning successful
public policies, or simply the success of democracy,
is how politics, and the public sphere in general,
can regain the trust and sympathy of people. 
To regain trust in politics, just like in everyday
life, is not an easy matter. One of the main
obstacles in this process is the consequence of a
peculiar feature of contemporary politics. The
general perception of national politics is mainly
influenced by the work of the government and 
by the relation between government and opposition.
The opposition is not in the position of gaining
sympathy from the citizens through measures
which are available to the governing parties; so
their only chance to score in the political game is to
continuously criticise the work of the government.
Moreover, these criticisms are directed 
personally against the members of the government,
and imply that the outcomes of otherwise very
complex governmental policies depend on the
individual qualities (expertise, honesty, etc.) of
these people. Accordingly, first, government 
and opposition will never work in true cooperation;
and second, opposition forces are not likely to
give up the weapon of criticising the government
through the personal condemnation of government
politicians. Politics could regain the trust of 
citizens through the activities of the government;
one of the most important aspects being that
government and state measures should place 
citizens in positions they can make the most of
in a predictable sort of way. In the situation
sketched this is not likely to happen, since the
fight between the government and the 
opposition alienates many people from politics.
Another aspect is connected to the tactics of
political competition. In the long run, the percentage
of uncertain voters is decreasing, and the results
of elections increasingly depend on the extent a
political party can mobilise their own supporters
(and less on the extent they can convince 
uncertain voters). This factor in itself makes for
a more antagonistic tone in politics, which is 
further fuelled by the media,  since personal
scandals form much better news material than
the abstract questions of public policies. 
According to studies in political science, in political
competitions where the political personages play
an important role (for example in the case of
presidential elections in the US), some of the
most important factors are reliability, authenticity
and honesty – increasingly more important than
stances on particular political issues. As a 
consequence, the candidates’ past becomes a central
features of the campaigns. In the next elections
in Hungary in the spring of 2006, present socialist
prime minister Ferenc Gyurcsány will face 
conservative opposition leader and former prime
minister Viktor Orbán. Gyurcsány is a former
Communist Youth Organisation functionary, who
became a billionaire, and pursues a largely
social-liberal political program with a socialist
party; Orbán is a former radically alternative
and anti-authoritarian student leader, who
became a conservative politician operating with
the notions of tradition and authority. Clearly,
this situation is bound to be confusing. The 
only answer to the doubts created by these confusi-
ons is faith, and indeed, the supporting camps 
of the two parties seem to become more and more
inflexible. And it is to be expected that raising
doubts in the followers of the opponent will not
rely on the discussion of policy issues, but rather
on undermining the personal credibility of their
leader. Another point is that single issue politics,
which replaces the more uniform and finished
public life of the ‘big society’, forms a better
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material for the media than say the political 
program of a party. It is not a coincidence then that
nationalist conservatism lives in a peculiar 
harmony with the tabloid press (as it is witnessed
for example by the recent events in the US).
Experience shows that trust in politics is not
increased by the larger presence of issues of foreign
politics in the press, since this area can be
exploited most effectively by the politics operating
with the usual means of political communication,
and this is of course registered by people. In
Hungary, ‘wall-to-wall’ total politics had the
strange result that everyone knows for example
which writer, architect or wine-maker belongs 
to which political side. And it is indeed almost
comical, that according to the view of those in
the know, the magazine ‘Magyar Horgász’
(‘Hungarian Angler’) serves a left-wing clientele,
whereas the rival ‘Sporthorgász’ (‘Sport Angler’)
is preferred by anglers of more right-wing 
sentiments.  
The changes in the methods and contents of 
politics caused difficulties also for politics itself.
Politicians participate in the jungle-fight of 
spin-politics with varying enthusiasm and boldness;
some of them obviously enjoy being ‘souped-up’
for the purposes of media entertainment. When,
however, things turn so to speak ‘serious’, 
politicians clearly regard distribution of goods as 
the only miracle weapon to maximise votes; this is
obviously influenced by the economic necessities
of the last fifteen years. One problem with these
‘let’s party as if there was no tomorrow’ type
campaigns is that they are nothing but 
preliminaries for the next package of restrictive
measures; another is that they do not even 
succeed in their intended purpose. Neither former
conser-vative prime minister Viktor Orbán, nor
former socialist prime minister Péter Medgyessy
managed to convert the distributed goods into
long-lasting popularity.  
The problems of the media
The most radical cultural changes after the 
transition from communism took place in the media.
A sharply increasing variety of media outlets
took the place of the former state-controlled
media, and  in this range, the ‘serious’ segment
occupies a decreasing percentage.  This process
provided an opportunity for many young people
to become the founders of new media genres
without any previous experience or training; a
new system of relations started to form between
media and politics; and audiences  enthusiastically
threw themselves into the enjoyment of  the
extended selection. However, the fundamental
categories of the discussion about the media
have not been properly articulated. Many critics
seem to expect the commercial channels to 
perform an educational function, they laugh at
the suggestion that media consumers are
autonomous agents in control of their decisions,
and there is still widespread ignorance about
the actual regulations governing the activity 
of the media. Public opinion – strongly supported
by the media – often overstates the effect of the
media on  politics and society. In hindsight, 
it would be an overstatement to hold television to
be solely responsible for the postmodern 
dominance of political communication. Besides,
research has shown that the media had an 
especially important political role in the 
post-communist transition, but this role decreases
in consolidated democracies (Voltmer & Schmitt-
Beck, 2002). New research also shows that the
internet reproduces, but does not create the
already existing active and isolated dispositions;
this should have a sobering effect on both the 
optimists and pessimists about the fundamental
social effects of the internet (Uslaner 2000). 
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The relation between media and politics is made
problematic by a number of self-reproducing 
conflicts. It seems that understanding the ‘mystical’
nature of freedom of speech and freedom of 
opinion is still an unconquerable task for both
politics and the public opinion. Hardly anyone
outside academic circles would recognise that
freedom of the press serves the interests of the
community not necessarily only if every speaker
is lead by the best intentions, formulates the
most virtuous messages, with the nicest choice of
words. Given that most messages do not conform
to this idea, the abstract value of freedom of 
the press is dwarfed by the – otherwise probably 
justified – torrent of complaints about various
productions in the media. Media and politics
inevitably have to relate to each other – but
their relation is characterised by mutual 
deceptions, conspiracies and suspicions. Politicians
fear the traps set by the media, while journalists
regard virtually everything politicians do as 
eye-wash or campaign manoeuvre. The state
communication of social policies is labelled as 
‘government PR’, and the lack of proper regulations
about election campaigns forces every participant
to gamble at the expense of the hoped for 
governmental position. Investigative journalism
tries to save the effort required by actual 
investigations with simply publishing documents
acquired at the political black-market. Thus by
turning political scandal into a marketable product,
the tabloid press has also entered to the world 
of public policy makers.  
A simplified view of political communication 
creates the widespread view that the more we see
a politician, or the more popular he or she is, 
the more votes they can count on at the elections.
This misconception produces a real vicious 
circle. The frequent presence in the media can be
achieved only by surrendering the content and
form of public appearances to the editorial 
principles of the popular media genres. Politicians
then blame the media for increasingly turning
parliamentary debates to a farce,  since the
evening news broadcast will pick on the most
ludicrous comments to amuse their viewers.
Meanwhile citizens are simply flabbergasted,
and cannot comprehend what it is that the
media offers under the label of ‘politics’. Single
issue movements have learnt the elementary
rules of the media’s needs, and so they burn
things or chain themselves to things or raise
roadblocks accompanied by the attention of the
cameras.  This sort of media attention questions
the competence of politics as a whole; since 
the truth is that the opposition hardly ever really
benefits from cornering the government through
this kind of manoeuvres. Another interesting
point is that long-term experience shows that
even well-organised interest movements sooner
or later inexplicably lose the support of the 
public (Page & Shapiro, 1992: 344). 
The problems of society
The post-communist transition posed trials worthy
of mythical heroes for the citizens of the Hungarian
democracy. Consider this: amidst the destruction
following the economic transition, they also had
to witness a thorough transformation of the 
norms of success, benevolence, rule following or
fairness, which was moreover accompanied by a
radical transformation of the public language.
The people of this late modern Babel learnt
through their own bitter experiences that no-one
else will stick up for them in their troubles.
No wonder then that the arguments condemning
the democratic deficit, and promoting instead
trust, acceptance of norms required for welfare,
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or voluntary participation in the sharing of burdens
– all these sound merely as unrealistic fantasies
or even worse, cynical pretence, for the majority
of the public opinion.
The skills, motivations and stock of roles that
many people developed in an earlier era for 
survival often form an obstacle to progress. This
is not a new experience in Hungary. In the 
later period of state socialism, relaxed economic 
regulations provided room for some private
enterprise. But the same socialist entrepreneurs
often failed among the circumstances of capitalism,
since the skills developed in the earlier context –
effective for the privatisation of the problems
caused by state-redistribution – proved to be
useless in the framework of real competition.
The pretence of efforts and the acquired attitude
of helplessness, the successful exploitation of an
‘it’s not my fault’ attitude when faced with
administrative authority – all these formerly
successful techniques became hindrances in the
new circumstances. The popular view always
suspects cheating behind achievements, and this
is combined with the equally popular mythologies
of  ‘one must not try too hard’ and ‘one should
not appear different’. All these attitudes contribute
to a self-fulfilling prediction which becomes 
an obstacle to change. A similar cultural or rather
psychological trap is to be found in the fact that
most people experience unpredictability as an
oppressing threat, and not as an opportunity 
to actively form their future. Depressing everyday
situations and the discouraging  state of public
affairs is not the only consequence of  the lack of
initiatives or enterprises based on dignified 
personal attitudes. One’s own time, own efforts,
own body or own health becomes valueless and
subject to exploitation. This is the root of 
problems which affect the whole of society.   
The dysfunctions of the dialogues in the public
sphere, portrayed and realised by the media –
and discussed above –, are accompanied by further
worrying aspects. In the absence of a sufficiently
colourful and robust publicity, no public appearance
can shed the suspicion of  dishonesty. Lack of
information necessarily brings susceptibility and
obsessive mistrust. People have no difficulty in
believing the most outrageous gossip about
politicians, and of course everyone knows that the
lottery is fixed and that the results of popular
TV contests are settled well in advance. The new
democracy hasn’t had time to develop its own
consensual and shared rituals, celebrations, or
symbols. The arbitrariness of selective memories
calls into doubt the whole process of remembering
the past. There has been no proper discussion 
of the historical traumas of Hungary’s twentieth
century history, and there is no real consensus
about the results of the post-communist phase in
our history either. In politics and public 
discussions, problems are usually blamed on the
previous regime or on the previous government.
The unquestionable values produced by the 
democratic transformation so far are under the
threat of becoming relativised or invisible.  
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The vicious circle formed by the negative 
characteristics of the Hungarian democracy is not
an unchangeable fate. Obviously, only fantasists
could claim that the present political system and
political culture which continuously reproduces
these problems could be changed from one day to
another. This, however, is not really necessary.
The institutions and processes of the Hungarian
democracy do not require a radical  transformation
comparable to a system change.5 However,
breaking out of the vicious circle requires a
contribution from all interested parties: this
means governmental politics, the institutions of
political competition, civil society, media, and 
of course, the citizens themselves.
Service state
The information society requires that not only
people, but also the state should perform a new
role. 6 The key moment in this new relation 
is the sharing of responsibilities. The fair and
effective social policy of an information society 
is called the service state. Shared responsibility
among the society, the service state, the civil
and business sphere makes sense only if each
party can trust the predictable achievement 
of the others. People should envisage the future not
as owners of life-long occupations and careers;
instead, they can better themselves by a constant
maintenance of their skills and expertise. As
long as the state expects people to bear the burdens
and tensions created by the information society,
this expectation can be justified only if the 
activity of the state itself is transparent, foreseeable,
user-friendly and ethical. One cannot gain
experience of these ideal features of the service
state merely by reading the papers or watching
TV; actual engagement in these activities is
required. The political state in the information
society is not represented anymore by the 
templelike atmosphere of governmental institutions,
but rather by the user-friendly, colourful and
interactive online surface. 
One of the minimal requirements of the service
state is to perform the traditional functions 
of the state at the high level which is reasonable
to expect. These functions include administrative
affairs, and service- and infrastructure-related
activities – at the registries, the state pension
funds, in state education or in the courts. The
service state should strive to achieve the following
situation: when in the future a visitor expresses
surprise over the effective functioning of a 
service or an institutions, we shall say ‘well of
course, this is state run!’. This – at present
admittedly Utopian – situation is still only the
minimum we should expect from the service
state. The point is not only better performance,
but a different way of performing the job. 
A NEW 
DISTRIBUTION OF
RESPONSIBILITIES
The service state expects society to do more than
passively demand benefits and services. The
state is entitled to this expectation only if it helps
the citizens – who live amidst the uncertainties
and risks posed by everyday life – to bring their
own decisions. This is the extra which gives 
the essence of the service state. The service state
should support and motivate people to preserve
their health and try to avoid becoming ill.
Attractive internet sites run by city councils
should help and inspire people to do something
for their local environment. The parents of talented
children will expect the state to foster and 
develop the talents of their children, just as the
parents of children with learning difficulties will
count on support and help. And so on. However,
the system of sub-politics does not mean that
governmental service turns into the local deli
where customers can do their little bits of shopping;
the essence of sub-politics is that people get
involved and share the responsibilities. To sum up,
in the information society, the most important
task of the service state is to help people to 
experience the contradictions and uncertainties of
the twenty first century as opportunities to be
exploited, and to help them to do something for
their own betterment.
The participants in the political
competition
It is important to see that the players in the
political competition can be realistically expected
to change things, that is, to exercise self-control,
only if this does not threaten their interests 
in maximising votes. It is also clear that, for the
reasons mentioned above, it is unlikely that
political players will return to the discussion of
the contents of political questions, and give up
their main weapon, questioning the trustworthiness
of their opponent. Consequently, the vision of
the government and the opposition working 
for the public good together, shoulder to shoulder,
is no more than a feeble populist notion.
Nonetheless, politics can actually do something 
to regain the trust of people. First of all, politicians
should be really careful to make it obvious that
although their position provides a number 
of privileges for them, what they do is still above
all a public service. It is in the interest of the
political elite not to let anyone to join its ranks
who expects society to offer privileges in return
for making decisions in the name of citizens.
Sometimes political competition licences acts
which would be scorned in the course of everyday
life. However, people in everyday life can afford
to be ‘crafty’ – they can use legal loopholes, 
they can discreetly use patronage; of course, as
long as it all remains within the boundaries of
legality. Not so for politicians – they should
always observe the rule that such craftiness is 
a forbidden territory for them. 
The personalised practice of politics, one which
ties political issues to the personalities of political
leaders, cannot be abolished anymore from the
public sphere. The person of a political leader
embodies the topics, directions and possibilities
of politics; represents the nation or history; and
with the weakening of the traditional ties to
political parties, also offers an opportunity for
citizens to identify with a certain cause (Corner
2000). For this reason, what is desirable is 
not the elimination of personalised politics, 
but rather that the political contestants should
develop their skills and make politics truly 
interesting and gripping in the course of open
debates. The ‘scientific’, administrative practice
of politics with a focus on the programs of political
parties is no closer to real politics than the 
personalised politics which is made alive by
relevant stories, conflicts and debates. The 
task is therefore simple: the political elite should
behave in the way politicians ought to.
26
27
Politicians shouldn’t pretend that exercising
political power is a burden or a necessity; they
shouldn’t expect veneration just because their
job is to make people trust them; and they should
never think that there aren’t at least ten people
who could do their job just as well as they can. 
Media
The advice that politicians behave as politicians
ought to, is – mutatis mutandis – even more
valid in the world of the media. The majority of
the present problems of the media could be
solved by more and better work. The occasional
vulnerability of journalists is more often a conse-
quence of their professional inadequacy, than a
result of the plotting of some institutional or
political magnate. Most of the problems in media
ethics are an outcome of individual decisions 
and actions by certain journalists or editors. The
prestige and position of every journalist would
improve if it ceased to be possible to base a radio
program on old internet hoaxes; if objective
reporting did not count as one opinion among
many; and if so-called ‘work’ did not consist simply
in lifting articles from the international press.  
A journalist with a sound professional back-
ground, one who enters into solidarity with his
or her similarly professional colleagues, would
presumably have a secure position in the hierarchy
of the media, and also an easier relation with
politics. In the long run, professional expertise
– including the dispositions of ethical behaviour
– is the best convertible capital in the media. Many
of the present problems of the media would 
find a solution if the commercial TV channels
entered the news contest. It would also be  a
great development if the first political investigative
TV program of the dual media system were 
born. The independent media should not only be
cheeky, but also innovative and clever.
Innovation would be required first of all in political
analysis: so that we could step beyond the state
where the critique and analysis of politics – lead
by the otherwise understandable motive of trying
to be popular – provides material again and again
for the reproduction of the culture vulnerability
and cynicism. Just as it would be great if 
humorous editorials could finally give up hassling
bus conductors, it would also be great if media
criticism didn’t pretend that everything the 
government or the opposition does aims only to
mislead people. The crisis of the public media 
is presumably not primarily the responsibility of
its actual leadership; however, their task would
be to try to preserve as much as they can until
the dawn of better days. The media as the broker
of culture could genuinely profit from an
innovative management of the various topics in
the sub-politics of society – say consumer protection
or the risks engendered by twenty first century
civilisation (Sharan, 2002). And of course the
democratic role of the tabloid press should not be
neglected either; democratic, since it takes politics
to people who would not otherwise be interested
in such issues (Creeber, 2004).
The society of citizens
The reader will perhaps ask: in this division 
of labour, what would be the role of everyday
people? The goal is a political culture which is
formed by the norms of dignity, responsibility
and solidarity – and to achieve this goal, society
itself has to do something. True, Hungarians 
dislike few things more than someone telling
them what they do wrong or without sufficient
enthusiasm. Still, one of the main deficiencies 
of the new Hungarian democracy is the fact that
politics – lead by the worry over the immature
state of society – has so far avoided straight talk
about the fair sharing of responsibilities. 
In everyday life, everyone has a chance to form 
a clear conception about the responsibilities of 
citizens in the new democracy. First of all, the best
way to do something for the society is to do
something for ourselves and for our loved ones.
Hungarians have already invested an enormous
amount of effort into their survival in the last
fifteen years. What is missing is rather the 
coordination of these efforts. Even though the 
rampant capitalism of the period right after the
transition could easily create the appearance
that the best way to better oneself is to neglect
the interests and values of others, it would be
very important to make people realise that this
is actually a misconception. In a civil society,
betterment in the long run is seldom achieved
without cooperation with others. We don’t 
necessarily have mass movements in mind; but
simply something like accepting a favour 
without fear and suspicion, a little bit of teamwork
to clean a section of our street, the discussion of
school business with other parents on a weekend 
afternoon.
If the service state is capable of providing 
opportunities for its citizens to do something for 
their own future; if political competition tries 
to win people’s sympathy through inspiring and
attractive dialogues; if a media with more content,
reliability and professional authority creates 
a public discussion that can accommodate the
notion of trust – if all this comes true, then 
the society will not need political pamphlets to
tell them how they should strive to achieve a
better life. 
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1 „If the elections took place this weekend, 39% of the interviewed 4000 young people felt certain they would go to
vote, and 13% was certain that they would definitely not vote. (…) As for preferences for parties, one third of the
interviewed subjects could not or would not name a single organization. (…) In 2000, the notion of being member of
a party or a political organization was virtually inapplicable, since among the 8000 subjects of the survey, only 32
indicated any connections of this sort. In this respect, the situation in 2004 was not significantly different. 38 subjects
reported membership in a party or youth political organisation, and an additional 22 said they were members of a
‘polgári kör’ (grassroots civil organisation, encouraged by and losely connected to the biggest conservative party).
2 Trust in institutions is not significantly different in the whole population or in the younger segments. (Ulram, 2003:
53; Tárki: 2002: 24.)
1998: On a scale1–7 (1=doesn’t trust, 7= trusts very much) the percentage of those giving 5–6–7. 
The question asked by Tárki in 2001-2002: How much do you trust X to represent your interests?
3 As Gábor Tóka points out, if we put aside those countries where voting is compulsory, the only country in political
cultures similar to ours where participation at elections is consistently high is Malta. Tóka explains this fact by the
highly polarised character of the political system. (Tóka 2002)
4 Let us remember what Oscar Wild said the main problem was with socialism: that it takes up too much free time.
5 Even though the majority of the Hungarian society is unsatisfied with the problem-solving ability of the democracy,
there is no fundamental refusal of the idea of democracy (Mishler & Rose, 1997). Recent research by Ulram 
(2003: 55) suggests a similar conclusion:
OPTIMISTIC DEMOCRAT: Committed to the idea of democracy and trusts that democracy is capable of solving the 
problem of his or her country
WORRYING DEMOCRAT: Supports the idea of democracy but is worried about the problem-solving abilities of democracy, 
ALIENATED: Not interested in the form of government 
AUTHORITARIAN: Holds that in certain circumstances  dictatorship is preferable to democracy 
6 Mészáros (2005) summarizes the possible conclusions from a game-theoretical approach of the structural 
conflicts between the interest of citizens and the nature of public goods. He suggests that dissolving the 
contradictions between the individual aspirations and the structure of public goods – tensions that lead to frustration
and material losses – can be hopped primarily from a reform of our institutions. 
TÁRKI TÁRKI
1998 2001. okt. 2002. júl.
President of the republic 53 4,46 4,59
Television and radio (TÁRKI: TV) 45 3,78 3,49
Papers, printed press 42 3,47
Army 40 4,08 4,32
Courts 39 3,96 4,24
The churches 37 3,29 3,40
Police 35 3,66 4,04
Prime minister 33 3,84 4,31
Authorities, public institutions 32 – –
Government 25 – –
Parliament (TÁRKI: MPs) 25 2,99 3,53
Trade unions 15 3,10 2,88
Parties 11 2,99 3,57
OPTIMISTIC WORRYING ALIENATED AUTHORITARIAN
DEMOCRAT DEMOCRAT
Austria 74 18 3 6
Hungary 47 25 16 13
Czech Republic 47 18 22 14
Poland 48 14 27 10
Romania 59 8 14 20
Russia 17 17 27 39
Argentina (1995) 55 28 28 11
NOTES
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